The RPs Debate Presidential Greatness: David Host Rebuts

Despite its brevity, Ford’s tenure offers more than its share of food for thought regarding the character of effective presidential leadership.  As Ron points out, Ford indeed represented the quintessential “manager;” a moderate who was ultimately guided by what he perceived as the demands of the time.  Far from the accommodationist caricature painted by his critics on the right, Ford did not hesitate to strike out on his own when necessary.  While the Nixon pardon offers the ultimate measure of this characteristic (the fact that he received the 2001 John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award demonstrates long-overdue liberal respect for this decision), Ford’s economic record also demonstrated a unique mix of toughness and pragmatism.

 

Taking office in the midst of the Arab oil shocks of 1973-74, Ford identified inflation as the chief focus of his economic policy.  Widely-derided at the time – and largely forgotten since – Ford’s “Whip Inflation Now” moniker reflected Ford’s deeply ingrained sense that inflation constituted the chief threat to long-term economic growth.  Initially proposing a mixture of tax increases and budget cuts, Ford later embraced a program of modest tax cuts paired with spending restraint (the latter generating a series of vetoes which strained his relationship with the large Democrat majorities in Congress). These policies worked: inflation in 1976 was 5.75%, as compared to 11.03% in 1974.  GDP grew at a rate of 5.4% in 1976 (after contracting -0.6% and 0.2% in 1974 and 1975, respectively), while unemployment fell from a high of 9% in May 1975 to 7.8% in December 1976.  The subsequent unraveling of the economy began with Jimmy Carter’s early 1977 “stimulus package” that failed to recognize the brisk growth Ford had bequeathed to him.  Matters grew worse, of course, with the second series of oil shocks in 1979.

 

By 1980, the popular perception of Ford’s presidency had changed to such a degree that liberal and moderate Republicans urged Ford to run against Reagan after George H.W. Bush faltered in the New Hampshire primary.  Had Ford gotten into the race, become the nominee, and defeated Carter that year, it is tempting – along the lines of Ron’s counterfactual analysis – to wonder whether Ford could have equaled Reagan’s record.  My own sense is that Ford would not have been nearly as effective as Reagan in selling the significant policy departures that had become necessary at home and abroad.  Likewise, I can’t imagine Reagan matching Ford’s success in steering the country through the post-Watergate environment in 1974.  

 

Expanding upon this notion, it becomes tempting to suggest that even the so-called “great” presidencies are merely the product of crisis times showmanship.  Viewed outside the prism of popular perception, even Lincoln and FDR had mixed records.  Had Lincoln lived, can we truly conclude that would he have fared any better than his successors in preventing the rise of Jim Crow?  Could his articulated policy of a “soft peace” toward the South have smoothed the path to true equality, or would the Lincoln of 1867 or 1868 be viewed today as a sell-out?  Similarly, does FDR truly deserve credit for lifting America from the depths of the Great Depression, or does World War II?  Would we view JFK the same way today had he survived to cope with the impact of his mistakes in Vietnam?

 

Yet, I think this view ultimately misses why Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan receive acclaim as “great presidents” while JFK retains a stature of “semi-greatness.”  Building upon Congressman Davis’ model of “consequential” presidencies, a “plus” factor seems to exist which distinguishes these men from other presidents who successfully managed significant crises, Ford among them; not to mention presidents like Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, whom we tend to view solely through the prism of their failures, notwithstanding LBJ’s huge contributions to the cause of civil rights or Nixon’s historic opening to China.

 

Perhaps the difference lies in what George H.W. Bush dismissed as “the vision thing.”  Adequately responding to the crises of the day (or, in Eisenhower’s case, managing to avert crisis) is clearly not enough.  Instead of managing the crises they confront, our greatest presidents appeared able to step “out of time,” in order to reshape the public’s perception of a crisis.  In so doing, they built the popular support necessary for dramatic departures in policy.

  

Ironically, Lincoln never enjoyed popular support during his presidency.  He was never elected by a majority (if one includes the seceded states in 1864).  He was further ridiculed among political opponents in the North almost as much as he was reviled in the South; one can only imagine how his suspension of habeas corpus would play in today’s political environment.  Yet, even amidst the uproar regarding the Bush Administration’s post-9-11 measures on constitutional grounds, I never heard anyone question Lincoln’s decision to simply ignore one of the constitution’s most important civil rights.  Doubtless many presidents since Lincoln – LBJ and Nixon among them – have drawn upon Lincoln for solace that history would forgive them any abuses of power, particularly in wartime.

 

It is, of course, possible that Lincoln’s greatness was established – and his mistakes forgiven – by the sheer enormity of the issues he confronted.  Yet, such a generalization minimizes the extreme division that persisted in the North regarding the Civil War, while diminishing the skill with which Lincoln balanced resolve with the necessity for political and military adjustments.  Particularly striking is how Lincoln carefully plodded his course, accounting for the risks on either side of each specific decision without sacrificing his ultimate goals.  He led – but he never allowed himself to get too far ahead of public opinion.  Most important, he understood his own limitations.  Never short on ambition throughout his life, Lincoln nevertheless remained practical regarding what he hoped to achieve at any given time.

 

Perhaps this innate sense of self helps us understand FDR and Reagan, as well.  Both experienced their moments of overreach, but both possessed the self-confidence to back away, change course, and pursue their objectives by other means.  Tellingly, despite numerous “flip-flops,” neither ever suffered from this label, as each possessed a keen understanding of timing (particularly as compared to our last two presidents: one can only imagine the difference had Bush undertook the surge before the Iraq War became truly unpopular or had Obama waited to push healthcare reform until after the economic recovery had taken hold).